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ABSTRACT 
 
Infrastructure can be unreliable and administration subject to corruption in Asia’s rapidly 
emerging economies. This context presented Singapore with unique opportunities to export its expertise to 
locations where these attributes are less certain, through the provision of superior infrastructure, the ability 
to negotiate investment concessions and, where existing, through the links to influential business groups in 
the investment location. This strategic initiative is further premised on the perception that Singapore’s 
positive reputation with multinationals, as well as ‘guanxi’, or connections, with Asian business networks, 
will give the industrial-township projects a marketing advantage. Their progress is a litmus test of 
Singapore’s ability to export its efficiency in industrial park development and management outside its 
borders. To complement our studies on Singapore’s flagship projects in Indonesia, China and India, this paper 
takes a closer look at Singapore’s lesser-known project, the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park. Evidence from 
on-site interviews and surveys are presented. This paper concludes that progress in this privileged 
investment zone remains stymied by particular dependencies in the host environment and, ten years on, the 
initial optimism with which this project was unveiled has not been justified. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore’s regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects, and a range of 
incentives and regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals move overseas. 
The program involved the establishment of industrial townships to create a ‘Singapore-styled’ business 
environment for Singapore-based companies to expand regionally. The Singapore government, in this 
instance, takes the initiative to develop regional sites as locations to access resources and markets. This 
strategic maneuver is premised on the perception that the redistribution of manufacturing activities to low-cost 
industrial sites will enhance the collective competitiveness of Singapore-based companies that redistribute 
their resource-dependent operations to these enclaves, as well as Singapore’s own competitiveness as a 
high-value investment location with strategic linkages to the region. Pari passu, Singapore lends its 
competitive strengths in industrial infrastructural development and management to these regional sites to 
enhance their competitiveness.  
 
 The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: the next section outlines the raison d’etre for 
Singapore’s regionalization stratagem, followed by an update on, the progress of the case study park. The 
third section sets out the analytical framework for our empirical analyzes, details the research methodology 
and presents the results of our empirical surveys, which are reinforced by case studies culled from in-depth 
interviews on-site. The concluding sections section consider the issues and challenges, as well as the 
implications of these experiences, for Singapore’s regionalization program, and invariably the city-state’s 
ability to export its efficiency in industrial park development and management outside its borders.  
 
SINGAPORE REGIONALIZATION STRATAGEM 
 
The city-state of Singapore has continually sought to overcome its resource limitations by 
extending its economic hinterland beyond its national boundaries. Singapore’s global outreach, supported 
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by constant economic reform and its competitive strengths, has allowed it to achieve remarkable economic 
growth in a relatively short span of time. To fuel economic development, the city-state began to make 
deliberate efforts to woo foreign investors with low-labor costs in the mid-1960s (Rodan, 1989; Regnier, 
1991; Huff, 1995; Pereira, 2000). This influx of investment remained the engine of growth until cheaper 
manufacturing locations that emerged in developing Asian countries eroded Singapore’s competitive edge. 
Subsequently, the government initiated a major industrial restructuring, which saw Singapore transforming 
itself into a hub for MNEs engaged in higher value-added manufacturing activities (Krause, 1987; Lim et 
al, 1988). By the late 1980s, Singapore boasted world-class infrastructure, an educated and highly skilled 
workforce and excellent business support.  
 
Singapore’s economic planners sought to expand the island's investment horizons through an 
overseas direct investment program launched in 19882.The main ideas were set out in the policy document, 
Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 
1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
Capitalizing on the liberalization of foreign investment controls and high growth rates in the Asia-Pacific 
region, Singapore looked to develop its ‘external wing’ by investing in countries across Asia (Wong and 
Ng, 1991; Regnier, 1993; Pang, 1995; Okposin, 1999; Blomqvist, 2002). Singapore’s regionalization 
program involved, amongst others3, the establishment of industrial parks in emerging economies in the 
Asian region which replicated the business environment found in Singapore (Perry and Yeoh, 2000; Yeoh 
et al., 2004a).The industrial parks were marketed as a propitious synergy of location-specific advantages 
and Singapore’s strengths in infrastructural development and management. These low-cost manufacturing 
enclaves were established, based on the premise that they would allow Singapore-based MNEs to maintain 
access to low-cost, resource-abundant centers for their resource-dependent operations, while conducting 
higher value-added operations in Singapore. Singapore’s regionalization program was intended to set in place 
a strategic configuration for the city-state to concentrate on higher value-added activities, and yet retain 
important linkages with production centers with low-cost environments. In effect, Singapore’s own 
environment for high-end operations, and its strategic links to low-cost centers in the region would then 
make it an attractive hub for global corporations. 
 
 This strategic repositioning was discussed at the 1993 Regionalization Forum, and encapsulated in 
the policy document, Singapore Unlimited (SEDB, 1993a; 1995a; 1995b). This point was amplified by the 
Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993: 13): 
 
‘… Other countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have invested overseas in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and China in a big way in the last 4-5 years. 
These investments will give their GNP an added boost. Mature economies like those of 
the US, Japan, France and Switzerland have this external dimension which broadens their 
domestic operations and help upgrade their economy. For the same reasons, we must 
grow an external wing to our economy.’ 
 
 The government’s role in the township developments was three-pronged. First, senior politicians 
and civil servants negotiated the institutional framework for the project, which typically involved garnering 
special investment conditions in the host location4. The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with 
business practice preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas Chinese’ (Hamilton, 1991; East Asia 
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Analytical Unit, 1995; Brown, 1998; Yeung, 2002), the ‘bamboo network’ which Singapore made use of in 
its industrial parks in Indonesia and China. Second, Singapore government agencies and government-linked 
companies (GLCs) were the prime investors in the infrastructure and real estate development, usually via a 
‘government-selected’ consortium (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998). Third, senior politicians were aggressively 
involved in the marketing and promotion of the parks:  
‘Companies can reduce their risks when venturing into Asia by linking up with local 
partners, and Singapore can help facilitate this process by acting as a ‘Partnership Centre’ 
to bring together strategic alliances for companies to invest in third countries in the East 
Asia region. … [We] can provide foreign companies with a convenient foothold through 
the industrial parks that are being built and managed by Singapore in China, India, 
Indonesia and Vietnam.’     
                   - Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
                                (Cited in Asian Review of Business and Technology, 1996) 
  
As well, Singapore’s premier investment promotion agency, the Singapore Economic 
Development Board, took on the role of ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageur’ (SEDB, 1995a), 
by encouraging foreign multinationals to locate their regional headquarters in Singapore, whilst 
redistributing lower-end operations to the industrial parks. The SEDB controls access to a wide range of 
taxation concessions and regulatory permissions in Singapore, and has great influence over investors who 
perceive cooperation with the EDB may bring business advantages (Perry, 1995).  The government also 
initiated a series of platforms for strategic discussions and collaboration to market Singapore’s overseas 
industrial parks (SEDB, 1993b). The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park, along with other similar parks in 
Indonesia, China and India, is an example of this mode of regionalization. 
 
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK (VSIP) 
 
 The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park is Singapore’s flagship industrial-park project in Vietnam. 
First proposed in March 1994 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s then 
Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, VSIP was officially launched in 1996. As with earlier projects, such as 
the Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) in Indonesia and the Suzhou-Wuxi experiments in China, Singapore 
looked to ‘export’ and synergize its efficient infrastructure and management expertise with competitive cost 
structures arising from location-specific resources in another Asian environment. 
 
VSIP is located in Bin Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City, and within a 40-minute 
drive from the international airport and seaports. The self-contained 1000-hectare park boasts a 
comprehensive suite of facilities such as prepared land plots, ready-built factories, and an on-site customs 
unit which allows for customs procedures and documentation to be done within the Park, as well as 
customs inspections within the tenant’s factories. Tenants also have access to a ready pool of low-cost labor 
from a 200,000 working population available within a 15-km radius. In addition, the Vietnam-Singapore 
Technical Training Centre (VSTTC) provides skilled manpower. Established in 1998, VTTSC is an S$9.5 
million three-way project between the Singapore and Vietnam governments and VSIP. For the first five 
years of VTTSC’s operations, VSIP was given priority for its graduates. These facilities are further 
complemented by Singapore management know-how and quality infrastructural support, allowing VSIP to 
offer convenient, ‘one-stop’ service to its tenants (VSIP Connection, various issues). 
 
In addition, to incorporate lesson learnt from its industrial park projects in China5 – hampered 
progress during their development phase due to uneven distribution of ownership and responsibility and 
insufficient identity of interest between the working parties on the ground – Singapore made deliberate 
efforts to foster strong collaboration with local authorities. VSIP is jointly developed by a Singapore 
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consortium led by SembCorp Industries6 and Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise. To pre-empt 
the perception that the VSIP was a partnership imposed upon by the central government, a Management 
Board, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee, was established at 
the inception of the park. The board, with representatives from the ministries of Trade, Finance and 
Interior, as well as the General Customs Department, oversees the issue of investment licenses, 
import/export permits, and construction permits 
 
SEDB’s role in promoting VSIP has been pivotal. Prior to the launch of VSIP in May 1995, a total 
of 13 international companies with investments worth US$80 million reportedly indicated their interest in 
the Park. Several companies acknowledged the SEDB’s efforts in marketing the Park and, in facilitating 
their set-up process. The pioneer tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food 
Industries (Philippines), and a mix of Singapore manufacturers like ST Automotive, Star Chemicals and 
Hwa Hup. The difficult environment post-1997, notwithstanding, cumulative investment commitments in 
VSIP exceeded US$350 million within the first three years from its launch. By 1998, investments from the 
30 tenants in VSIP amounted to US$370 million. In the following year, VSIP saw an increase of tenants to 
33, with aggregate investment exceeding US$400 million. Then, VSIP had tenants from 10 different 
countries, investing in a wide range of industries, including food, electrical and electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries. Today, over 
US$600 million has reportedly been invested in the development of VSIP, while investment commitments 
by the Park’s tenants are currently valued in excess of US$1 billion. As at May 2004, VSIP has 138 
committed tenants from 21 countries, of which 80 are already operational. 26,000 jobs have been created, 
with the number expected to rise to 40,000 when the rest of the tenants start their operations (Table 1). The 
Park posted its first profits of US$4 million in 2002. Net profit for 2003 stood at US$4 million, and is likely 
to exceed US$6million in 2004. 
 
VSIP has a list of priority industries, which adheres closely to the official list of preferred 
industries7. However, VSIP is less selective in its tenant profile, as can be observed from the diverse mix of 
tenants. This is in marked contrast to the Indonesian parks, where the focus on electronics and other light 
industries complements the restructuring of Singapore’s manufacturing sector. VSIP’s sector mix ranges 
from electronics to light industries to pharmaceuticals (Table 2), while the tenant mix reflects the 
importance of Asian MNEs (Table 3). Singaporean and non-Asian companies are represented in a broad 
swathe of industries, in a broad swathe of industries - food, electrical and electronics, pharmaceuticals and 
healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries, while the Japanese companies are 
largely concentrated in electronics. VSIP’s major tenants include Konica, Nitto Denko, Kimberly-Clark, 
Diethelm and Roche.  
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm proffered an analytical framework to examine the pattern and extent 
of activities of firms engaged in value-added activities beyond their national boundaries (Dunning 1980, 
1988, 2001). It sought to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets and delve into the 
reasons behind their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign production rather than domestic 
production, exports or portfolio resource flows. The eclectic paradigm postulates that foreign investment 
will only occur if it is advantageous to combine spatially transferable intermediate products produced in the 
home country, with at least some immobile factor endowments or other intermediate products in another 
country. Specifically, the configuration of ownership-specific advantages, internalization-incentive 
advantages, and location-specific advantages (OLI) determines international production and its nature. The 
framework goes on to assert that the import of each advantage in the OLI triumvirate and the relationship 
between them varies across firms, industries and countries and is context-specific. More recent literature 
has widened the ambit of the eclectic paradigm to include deliberations on the role of infrastructure in the 
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attraction of new investments (Peck, 1996); the location tournaments for foreign investments (Lundan 
2003); the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-added activities (Markusen, 1996; Porter, 
1998); the agglomeration economies of spatial proximity (Krugman, 1998; Porter, 1996); and the business-
government nexus in alliance capitalism (Dunning 1995, 1997; Dunning and Narula, 1996).  
 
From the firm’s perspective, Porter (1994, 1996, 2000), among others, has argued that not only 
should the production process be viewed as a value chain, but also that firms should identify comparative 
or location-specific advantages unique to each country/territory, which will serve to complement the 
competitive and firm-specific advantages specific to their core functions. Furthermore, according to 
rationalization theories, firms should situate their operations in different locations to capitalize on the 
comparative advantages offered in each location. In addition, Dunning (1998) has reiterated the importance 
of created location-advantages in the new economics of competition. As created assets supersede natural 
factor endowments as a key determinant of location, the roles of governments in advancing the 
competitiveness of a country or region within a country need to be altered accordingly. Inter alia, 
governments need to ensure that availability, quality and cost effectiveness of general purpose inputs match 
up to the standards of their global competitors, create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos that 
facilitates a continuous upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and facilitate, 
rather than impede micro-regional clusters development and upgrading (Dunning, 1995, 1997; Stopford, 
1999, Porter 1998, 2000). Singapore’s involvement in VSIP and corollary partnership with the Vietnamese 
government and state-owned enterprises represents an effort to synergize superior infrastructure and 
efficient and transparent management practices, with the location-specific advantages of Vietnam. The 
underlying intention is to create an enclave, within a more uncertain environment, where firms can exploit 
location-specific advantages with greater ease and security. 
 
VSIP aims to provide location-specific advantages for firms with manufacturing operations, 
particularly those that look to gain easier access to the Vietnamese and neighboring markets. The Park 
offers abundant unskilled labor and other local resources at low cost, and proximity to target markets. 
These pull factors are enhanced and strengthened by world-class infrastructure within the park, strong 
commitment and support from the local authorities and growing bilateral economic cooperation between 
Singapore and Vietnam. The envisaged product of this combination is an industrial park, distinct amidst the 
competition, which presents itself as attractive investment enclave. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Research Methodology 
To obtain primary data on the differential impact of various pull/push factors on the location-
decisions of firms in VSIP, we applied a modified version of the survey questionnaire developed in Yeoh, 
et al (2000) to the tenants in the park. The questionnaire survey focused on three main areas. Firstly, the 
profile of the respondents: type of ownership, nature of operations, establishment size (number of 
employees), sales turnover and market orientation; the second section was structured to gauge the 
differential impact of various push/pull factors on firms’ decision to locate in the case-study park. Data on 
various constraints were gathered in the third section. Other questions pertaining to the respondents’ views 
on the facilities and services in the Parks were culled from open-ended questions. As well, in-depth case 
studies of selected VSIP tenants were conducted for a firm-level analysis. The fieldwork was conducted 
between December 2003 and July 2004. This section presents our survey results.  
 
Questionnaire Survey 
Profile of respondents 
We interviewed 47 companies in VSIP, which represented 34 percent of the committed tenants in 
VSIP at the time of the interview. The interviewees were all senior managers at the facilities. Of the 47 
respondents, 10 were wholly Singapore-owned, 2 were joint-ventures and 35 were wholly foreign-owned. 
There were 29 small firms, 9 medium-sized firms, and 9 large firms. As for their nature of operations, 20 
manufactured consumer products, 12 manufactured intermediate products, 3 were involved in industrial 
services, 1 company manufactured capital goods and the rest involved in other operations. In terms of 
market orientation, 19 respondent-companies targeted the domestic (Vietnam) market, 18 exported mainly 
to the other ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) economies, while Japan was the primary 
market for 10 of the companies interviewed. None of the respondents exported to the Chinese or South 
Korean markets.  
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses relating to 
factors and constraints, a logit model was applied to compare the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ 
decision to locate in VSIP and the constraints they encountered. With the aim of examining the 
attractiveness of the Singapore style infrastructure as well as its suitability to the operation of MNCs,  
foreign firms are compare to Singaporean firms, pertaining to the push and pull factors affecting them to 
locate in VSIP. As the operational needs of large firms can be significantly different from those small and 
medium firms, also most of the foreign firms located in VSIP are large firms, the size of the firms are thus 
taken as another variable; particularly comparing large firms to small and medium firms.  The (cumulative) 
logistic distribution function, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
where:   Pi is the probability of firm i choosing the factor in question, 
exp refers to the exponentiation operator and 
Zi is a linear function of the firm attributes
8
 defined as: 
Zi = α0 + α1F + α2 L 
where:   F = 1 if wholly foreign-owned, 0 otherwise 
L = 1 if large (> 500 employees), 0 otherwise 
α0 = constant term 
αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
  
Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit model are statistically significant (as indicated by 
the z- statistics and p-values), this would imply that the probability of a firm (e.g. foreign-owned) choosing 
a particular factor is greater than the probability of another firm (of different ownership type) making the 
choice, after taking into consideration the size of the firms. 
 
Factors Influencing Respondents’ Decision to Invest in VSIP (Tables 4 and 5) 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the low-cost labor available in 
the host environments to market its industrial parks. It supplements these purported advantages with its 
political commitment to the parks, as demonstrated by the many bilateral agreements between Singapore’s 
government agencies, and government-linked companies, with the host governments (or, political-linked 
business conglomerates, as in the case of Indonesia). Interestingly, political commitment from the 
Singapore government was not a major pull factor for most of the respondents. Out of 47 respondents, only 
9 cited it as a main pull factor of VSIP; a marked contrast from our earlier studies on the Singapore-styled 
parks in Indonesia (Yeoh et al., 2004 b).  
 
There is a host of investment incentives that entice multinationals to locate their lower value-
added activities in these self-contained enclaves. This has been proven true from our survey as 64% of the 
tenants surveyed citing it as a significant pull factor; making it a third-ranked main pull factor. 
 
Political commitment of the Vietnamese government was ranked the main pull factors of VSIP, by 
around 80% of the tenants interviewed. This could be a reflection of investors’ worries over Vietnam’s 
political-economic environment, and the impact on their operations.  
 
Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was also the Parks’ 
main draw, with 77% of the respondents citing it as a pull factor for them to locate in the Park. From our 
statistic analysis, we could not find significant difference between foreign and Singaporean firms and 
Singaporean join ventures pertaining to the Singapore style infrastructure as a pull factor. However, their 
views regarding the competitive labor cost as a main pull factor are different.  Compared to Singaporean 
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firms and join ventures, foreign firms are less likely to choose competitive labor costs as a main pull factor 
for them to locate in VSIP, taking into consideration the size of the firms. This is indicated by the negative 
and statistically significant α1 (-1.938). In place of the competitive labor costs, foreign firms were more 
likely to choose access to overseas markets as the main pull factor in VSIP as compare to Singaporean 
firms and joined venture; again taking into consideration the size of the firms. This is again indicated by the 
positive and statistically significant α1 (2.058). Large firms, as compare to small and medium firms, are 
also more likely to chose access to overseas markets as the main pull factor of VSIP, indicated by the 
positive and statistically significant α2 (1.338).  Taken together, it can be argued that easy accessibility to 
overseas markets was a key determinant in the location choice of foreign MNCs while Singaporean firms 
focus more on cost savings.  
 
Large firms are also more likely to consider competitive overhead as a main pull factor for them to 
locate in VSIP, as compare to small and medium firms; indicated by the positive and statistically significant 
α2 (1.807). This can be argued that with their bigger size and more complicated operation, especially the 
demand for expensive machineries as well as educated and experienced management teams, overhead costs 
take up a very significant percentage of large firm’s total operation costs, driving them to pay particular 
attention to it.  
 
Other frequently cited factors included access to domestic markets, competitive labor costs, access 
to overseas markets and availability of skilled and educated labour. These factors were highlighted by 47%, 
43%, 32% and 26% of respondents respectively, underlining the location-specific advantages offered to 
firms by VSIP.  
 
Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in VSIP (Tables 6 and 7) 
VSIP is now an established industrial estate development, but our study alludes to emerging 
constraints which have undermined the attractiveness of the Park. These constraints are categorized into 
three broad groups, namely, those relating to labor, those relating to organization and technology, and those 
relating to the “environment” (e.g. government policies / regulations). 
 
72% of the respondents identified shortages of professionals and managers as the major constraint 
on their VSIP operations. Another frequently cited labor-related constraint was the shortage of semi-skilled 
or skilled labor (53%), an indication that VSTTC graduates may not yet be equipped with the relevant skill-
sets sought by tenants. Surprisingly, not many respondents complained about high and/or rising labour 
costs, unlike our other studies in Indonesia and China, indicating that the location-specific advantage of 
‘competitive’ labour costs proffered by VSIP remains very much a reality. 
 
However, the Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be 
costly. The three most frequently cited organization/technology-related problems faced by the respondents 
were high and/or rising overhead costs, difficulty in sourcing raw materials and lack of good supporting 
services. These constraints were highlighted by 38%, 38% and 34% of the respondents respectively. Not 
many complained about rising labour costs. Out of the 47 respondents, only 6 cited it as a main push factor 
of VSIP. This is significantly different form our studies of other industrial parks such as SIP in China 
where rising labour costs were frequently cited. This again proves the location-specific advantage offer by 
VSIP to the firms. Interestingly, compare to small and medium firms, large firms are more likely to 
consider it as a main constraint of VSIP to them. This is indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant α2 (2.666).   
 
 Significantly, almost 50% of the respondents cited ‘impact of government policies/regulations’ as 
a major problem confronting their operations in VSIP, suggesting that the host government’s control over 
the operating environment, has proved stifling. As well, almost 50% of the respondents highlighted 
‘competition from overseas competitors’, and the economic landscape shaped by overseas industry 
competitors, as particularly challenging to their VSIP operations.  
 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
Like the other flagship projects in Indonesia and China, VSIP was marketed as a low-cost 
manufacturing enclave, supported by excellent, ‘Singapore-styled’ infrastructure and management 
expertise. From our study, however, it would seem that while the localized ‘superior’ infrastructure and the 
factor conditions were main determinants that shaped the competitive environment in VSIP, it was the 
political commitment of the host government, more so than that of the Singapore government, which was 
similarly a main determinant. Created location advantages were also found to be more crucial to small and 
medium-sized firms than large firms, due to said firms having comparatively fewer resources and less 
extensive networks. These results lend support to the rationalization theories, and affirm the agglomeration 
economies suggested by the location theories, referred to earlier in this paper. 
 
The Singapore-styled parks in Indonesia, India, China and Vietnam have secured a definitive edge 
over their competitors due to the many exclusive and unprecedented privileges accorded to them by host 
institutions. While our research shows that respondents did indeed locate operations in VSIP because of 
these purported advantages, we also find that a myriad of issues and challenges have thwarted VSIP from 
delivering the one-stop service and location-specific advantages it was designed to offer, restricting 
expansion and diversification of certain types of operations. A shortage of more highly-skilled manpower, 
for example, hinders the development of sophisticated manufacturing operations, as well as research and 
development. Many tenants have been forced to incur higher costs either training locals or hire skilled 
professionals at a premium, or face voids in positions requiring labour expertise; as a result, companies 
engaged in high-end manufacturing tend to be limited to smaller operations. Our study also points to 
VSIP’s limitations in serving tenants from a spectrum of industries, and, consequently, a failure in 
delivering efficient infrastructure and administration to all tenants; arguably, then, VSIP has not quite lived 
up to its promise to provide reliable one-stop service within a self-contained environment – at least as far as 
specific industries go. It would seem that VSIP might possibly be a little too suited to labour-intensive 
operations for its own good. 
 
Another set of limitations faced by VSIP has been arguably due to the fact that its advantages were 
presaged upon a static environment. Said ‘advantages’ have since been eroded by various economic 
realities; its infrastructural advantages, for example, quickly became less relevant due to improvements in 
the host environment. Improvements in transportation networks and the national power grid, among others, 
reduced the importance of VSIP’s supposedly more reliable power supply, and its proximity to Ho Chi 
Minh City, airports, and seaports. Strangely enough, these local infrastructural projects have also translated 
into a plethora of miscellaneous fees, which have added to the operating fees of VSIP’s tenants; a lack of 
transparency from local administrators, as well as the persisting problem of corruption, only exacerbates 
this challenge for VSIP. The market realities of heightened competition have also made their weight felt, 
with the entry of newer industrial estates such as the Linh Trung Export Processing Zone, on top of 
incumbents like the Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone. Established by experienced and street-savvy 
developers from Taiwan, China and Thailand, these competitor parks market themselves aggressively on 
price, charging lower transportation fees accruing from more strategic locations. The result has been a 
diminishing of VSIP’s location specific benefits, and the calling into question of the premium attached to 
‘superior infrastructure’ in VSIP; all of this at a time when ever-increasing investor interest in China has 
created a struggle for VSIP to continue to attract the same. Political support from local authorities has also 
proven to be, in reality, less significant than initially envisaged; our on-site interviews point to negative 
undercurrents over Singapore’s control and management of VSIP, and anecdotal evidence suggests local 
sentiments towards the Singapore partners were not unlike those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience 
in China, and these perception differences have translated into protracted conflicts and project delays, 
further compromising the competitiveness of VSIP. It is conceivable that the ownership-management 
structure of VSIP may, in time, be restructured to reflect a better alignment of interests, as occurred in 
Suzhou. Significantly, Singapore’s SembCorp-led consortium has announced plans to divest itself of part of 
its stake in VSIP, even as the Park is finally registering positive returns on its investment. 
 
Nevertheless, VSIP has managed to provide some purported location-specific advantages such as 
unskilled labor at competitive cost. It appears that VSIP is best suited for companies with labor-intensive 
operations, as they can tap into the vast pool of unskilled labor and rely less on expensive capital. This 
could explain the predominance of firms engaging in low value-added, labor-intensive activities in VSIP. 
In this respect, VSIP remains competitive and, with its ‘Singapore-styled’ facilities and amenities, 
continues to stand out from other locations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the initial blueprints of VSIP as a privileged investment enclave in an uncertain context 
were promising, actual results have indicated their limitations and the early over-optimism over their 
outcome. While Singapore did successfully ‘export’ its expertise in infrastructure and administration, both 
‘software’ and ‘hardware’ were subject to the social, political and economic environments in Vietnam. 
Given the shortage of skilled labor, endemic corruption and other limitations inherent in the host context, 
the maintenance of a world-class facility proved costly. Furthermore, the Park has failed to provide an 
environment for tenants looking to expand their operations to include high value-added activities. As well, 
economic realities have created a necessity for VSIP to constantly seek new methods to distinguish the park 
from competitor parks, even as a site best suited for labor-intensive, low-end manufacturing. We therefore 
postulate that, as evidenced from the VSIP experience, the underlying assumption that an investment 
enclave can exist, relatively isolated from the conditions in the host environment is unrealistic. Regardless 
of the privileges it enjoys, VSIP’s success is, to an extent, dependent on uncontrollable external factors. 
Thus far, an array of nuances radiating from the host environment, and alluded to in this study, have 
stymied the progress of this privileged investment enclave. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park 
Operational Statistics 
 
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Annual Export Value (for 2002) 
No. of Employees 
 
 
US$600 million 
138 
300 hectares 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
26,000 
 
 
Source: VSIP Fact Sheet, May 2004. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park 
Tenant Profile by Sector 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Electronics 11 Consumer goods 14 
Food 9 Logistics 14 
Light industries 20 Parts and components 10 
Pharmaceuticals 9 Others 13 
 
Source: SembParks Management. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park 
Tenant Profile by Country of Origin 
 
Country Percent 
Singapore 24 
Japan 21 
Taiwan 17 
Other Asian Countries 22 
US and Europe 16 
 
Source: SembParks Management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Factors Influencing Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in VSIP 
(by popular ranking) 
 
Factors Frequency Rank 
Political Commitment (Singapore government) 6 9 
Political Commitment (Vietnam government) 37 1 
Infrastructure Facilities & Support Services (VSIP) 36 2 
Investment incentives 30 3 
Human Resource-Avail. skilled/educated labor 12 7 
Human Resource-Competitive labor costs 20 5 
Physical Resource-Competitive overheads 6 9 
Access to overseas market 15 6 
Access to domestic market 22 4 
Presence of major buyers 11 8 
Presence of major suppliers 4 11 
Presence of major competitors 1 12 
 
 
Table 5 
Factors Influencing Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in VSIP 
(By Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit) 
 
Push/Pull Factors α1(Foreign) α2(Large) 
-0.405 -19.512 Political commitment (Singapore government) (0.672)  (0.999)  
0.325 -0.812 Political commitment (Vietnam government) (0.684)  (0.325)  
0.091 1.046 Infrastructure Facilities & Support Services 
(VSIP) (0.907)  (0.352)  
-1.333 -1.011 Investment incentives 0.122  0.197  
1.634 1.118 Human Resource-Avail. Skilled/educated labor 0.145  0.168  
-1.938 -1.266 Human Resource-Competitive labor costs 0.014 ** 0.182  
-0.573 1.807 Physical Resource-Competitive overheads 0.566  0.055 *** 
2.058 1.338 Access to overseas market 0.068 *** 0.106 *** 
-1.096 -0.078 Access to domestic market 0.119  0.919  
-0.115 -0.078 Presence of major buyers 0.882  0.930  
0.017 0.377 Presence of major suppliers 0.989  0.758  
17.669 -17.579 Presence of major competitors 0.999  0.999  
 
Note:   * Significant at 1% level 
 ** Significant at 5% level                           
*** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
 
 
Table 6 
Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in VSIP 
(by popular ranking) 
 
Factors Frequency Rank 
Labor-related Constraints 
Shortage of semi-skilled/skilled labor 25 2 
Shortage of professionals & managers 34 1 
Rising labour costs 6 11 
Low labour productivity 11 8 
High absenteeism 6 11 
Industrial relations problems 6 11 
Organizational/Technological-related Constraints 
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 9 9 
Difficulty in sourcing raw materials 18 5 
Difficulty in introducing new technology & 
techniques 8 10 
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 5 14 
Lack of good supporting services 16 7 
High/rising overhead costs 18 5 
‘Environmental’-related Constraints 
Government regulation 22 3 
Competition from overseas competitors 22 3 
 
 
Table 7 
Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in VSIP 
(by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit) 
 
Constraints α1(Foreign) α2(Large) 
Labor-related Constraints 
0.645 -0.469 Shortage of semi-skilled & skilled labor 0.344  0.534  
-0.171 -0.330 Shortage of professionals and managers 0.823  0.679  
0.602 2.666 Rising labor cost 0.635  0.007 *    
-0.143 0.635 Low labor productivity 0.856  0.435  
0.581 0.872 High absenteeism 0.616  0.366  
0.613 -0.216 Industrial relations problems 0.594  0.854  
Organizational/Technological-related Constraints 
1.281 -20.081 Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 0.259  0.999  
0.324 -0.951 Difficulty in sourcing raw material 0.649  0.274  
1.000 1.185 Difficulties in introducing new technology and 
implementing new techniques 0.382  0.171  
0.024 0.549 Lack of good supporting services 0.973  0.468  
0.309 1.194 Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 0.795  0.234  
-0.227 0.888 High or rising overhead 0.744  0.239  
‘Environmental’-related Constraints 
-0.168 -0.111 Impact of government regulations 0.802  0.882  
0.284 -0.130 Competition from overseas competitors 0.675  0.862  
 
Note:   * Significant at 1% level 
 ** Significant at 5% level                       
 *** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. Non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
 
